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Article 
 
Binding the United Nations: Compulsory Review of 
Disputes Involving UN International Responsibility 
before the International Court of Justice  
Anastasia Telesetsky* 
ABSTRACT 
One of the gaps in the International Law Commission’s Draft 
Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations is a 
discussion of mechanisms for judicially reviewing the possibility of 
international responsibility of international organizations such as the 
United Nations (UN). This article explores the judicial mechanisms that 
exist to review actions or omissions that might implicate international 
legal responsibility of the UN and its specialized agencies. The analysis 
that follows explores two options under the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) Statute for enhancing UN judicial accountability: (1) amending 
Article 34 of the ICJ Statute, and (2) providing for an international 
agreement requiring the UN to submit disputes implicating responsibility 
to the advisory jurisdiction of the ICJ. Since States would be unlikely to 
agree to amend Article 34 because of existing controversies over UN 
reform, this option is ultimately discounted. The article concludes that 
States should instead enlarge the ICJ’s practice of issuing advisory 
opinions that “bind” parties to guarantee that the doctrine of international 
organization responsibility is coherently applied to the UN.  
I. INTRODUCTION  
As an intergovernmental organization, the United Nations (UN) has 
recently tarnished its record in Haiti. In April 2004, after President 
Aristide’s departure from Haiti, the United Nations Stabilization Mission 
 
* Anastasia Telesetsky is an Associate Professor of International Law at the University of 
Idaho. The author would like to thank Julia Norsetter and the other members of the 
Minnesota Journal of International Law for all of their helpful comments in preparing this 
article for publication. 
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in Haiti (MINUSTAH) arrived as a peacekeeping force.1 While 
conducting missions within neighborhoods to target rebel leaders, the UN 
peacekeeping forces were accused of killing civilian bystanders,2 
including children.3 There has been no formal judicial review regarding 
the UN’s decision of whether to provide compensation to the families of 
the victims or to the State of Haiti for the actions of the UN affiliated 
peacekeepers.  
More recently, the UN in Haiti has been accused of being a vector 
for cholera after the organization deployed a unit of Nepalese 
peacekeepers to Haiti without testing all individuals in the unit for 
cholera.4 At least one epidemiologist has suggested that the specific 
cholera outbreak that killed 2000 and hospitalized 100,000 others was 
probably imported.5 As with the civilians caught in the crossfire of the 
peacekeepers, there has been no judicial review of the UN’s actions. 
Rather, the UN will analyze internally whether it proceeded with due 
care in its humanitarian deployment and it will decide unilaterally 
whether it will compensate victims for their losses.  
In the wake of these two incidents involving peacekeepers operating 
under the control of the UN, a question of UN responsibility arises: Does 
the State of Haiti, on behalf of its citizens, have a cause of action against 
the UN for violating basic international human rights law? After all, the 
UN may have been responsible for depriving life to civilians by 
exacerbating existing dangerous conditions and creating unnecessary 
risk. If we accept the principle that international subjects that have rights 
should also have responsibilities, Haiti may have an actionable claim 
against the UN for breaching customary international legal obligations to 
protect the fundamental human rights of civilians.  
This raises a number of fascinating international legal questions. If 
Haiti were to attempt to bring a case within its own courts, would the UN 
be protected from domestic prosecution by claims of absolute privileges 
and immunities? Could the UN even be prosecuted for violating 
fundamental international rights when the constitutive documents of the 
 
 1. See Restoring a Secure and Stable Environment, UNITED NATIONS 
STABILIZATION MISSION IN HAITI, 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minustah/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2011). 
 2. See U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Secretary-General on the U.N. 
Stabilization Mission in Haiti, ¶¶ 11–15, U.N. Doc. S/2006/1003 (Dec. 19, 2006).  
 3. See Sandra Jordan, World: Haiti Deaths Blamed on UN Troops: Mourning 
Parents Accuse Peacekeepers of 'Collateral' Deaths in Battle to Rid Slums of Gangs,  THE 
OBSERVER, Apr. 1, 2007, at 36, available at ProQuest, Doc. No. 1248229141 (referencing 
a man claiming his son was killed by the peacekeepers from the UN Stabilization Mission 
in Haiti). 
 4. See Haiti Cholera Outbreak: Nepal Troops Not Tested, BRIT. BROADCASTING 
CORP. (Dec. 8, 2010), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-11949181.  
 5. See id. 
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organization provide no explicit language assigning responsibility to the 
UN to protect these rights?6 Because the UN is not a State, this paper will 
not directly address whether the UN has obligations under international 
treaty law, but will instead start its analysis from the assumption that the 
UN, like other international legal actors, can be held responsible and 
accountable for breaches of international law. Assuming that the UN 
should be held legally responsible for breaches of customary 
international law, one is left to wonder, practically speaking, how Haiti 
might be able to bring an international legal claim against the UN.  
What are Haiti’s options for seeking a binding judicial review? 
Under the current international legal framework, Haiti’s options are 
limited. For example, it could potentially bring a judicial action against 
the UN agencies responsible for deploying the peacekeeping forces 
seeking damages in its own court system.7 The UN, however, would 
likely invoke privileges and immunities available under both the UN 
Charter and the two conventions on privileges and immunities. Using a 
different tactic, Haiti could entreat the UN Secretary-General to pay 
reparations to its damaged citizens as ex gratia payments.8 Finally, Haiti 
could appeal to the good conscience of the Member States of the UN 
agency to see that its citizens have some remedy supplied by the UN.9 
However, none of these options has the certainty of systematized judicial 
review, and all of them have the potential for widely varying recoveries 
under disparate remedy theories.  
PROPOSED ARGUMENT 
This paper begins with the premise that every UN Member State is 
entitled to neutral legal review of UN actions by a court of law. This is 
needed because the existing internal review by UN administrators alone 
will not suffice.10 Given a State’s uncertain options for formally seeking 
 
 6. UN responsibility is not mentioned in the UN Charter. Rather, the UN is 
expected to help “achieve international cooperation . . . in promoting and encouraging 
respect for human rights.” U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 3. This language makes historical 
sense. The UN was considered post-World War II to be collaborative club of nations. The 
current powerful reach of the UN, as a policymaker and deliverer of public goods (e.g. 
security, development services), was not envisioned in 1945.  
 7. See generally August Reinisch, Securing the Accountability of International 
Organizations, 7 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 131 (2001) (referring to recurring problems in 
addressing UN accountability and lack of certainty about where to bring cases identifying 
potential UN responsibility under international law). 
 8. See generally id. (referring to the recurring problems in addressing UN 
accountability and the lack of certainty about where to bring cases identifying potential 
UN responsibility under international law). 
 9. Id. 
 10. For the purposes of this paper, the term “UN” is used to encompass all UN 
institutions including all organizations, agencies, and missions that derive authority under 
the UN Charter or the constitutive documents for UN specialized agencies. 
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UN liability, this paper argues that a mechanism is needed for resolving 
international legal disputes between Member States and the UN. Due to 
the fifty plus years of inertia in attempting to amend Article 34 of the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) Statute11 to include international 
organizations within the ICJ’s contentious jurisdiction, this article argues 
for a less obvious but equally viable approach to binding the UN. This 
would be an agreement that would require the ICJ to issue a “binding 
advisory opinion” for all cases involving an unsettled controversy 
between a State and the UN concerning UN responsibility.  
This article’s analysis begins with an overview of the International 
Law Commission’s Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International 
Organizations as a codification of UN legal responsibility. This overview 
examines the existing challenges of practically assessing UN 
responsibility and liability. The second part of the paper explores two 
proposals that would provide meaningful judicial review of UN 
responsibility and liability: 1) reviving historical efforts to amend Article 
34 of the ICJ Statute to give the ICJ compulsory jurisdiction over 
contentious matters involving the UN as a party, and 2) expanding the 
realm of ICJ “binding advisory opinions” through a treaty designed to 
provide a legal mechanism to ensure UN accountability. While both 
proposals would result in the ability of the ICJ to issue binding opinions 
in cases where the UN is a party, the paper concludes that a draft treaty, 
rather than an amendment, is politically more viable because it would not 
trigger the expansive amendment process of the ICJ Statute. This paper 
argues for the need to ensure that the ICJ, as the principal judicial organ 
of the UN, has the functional capacity to review UN actions and make 
public findings on responsibility and liability. 
In order for this proposal to be effectuated, States must identify a 
mutually agreeable and reliable judicial review mechanism. This 
mechanism is absent in our current international legal system. As Geoff 
Gilbert suggests in his work on the United Nations High Commission for 
Refugees (UNHCR), the UN is largely judgment-proof.12 Gilbert uses the 
example of repatriated refugees who were brutally persecuted on their 
return to their home country after the UNHCR ordered the closure of a 
refugee camp.13 Reflecting on the options of the refugees to seek justice, 
he observes that “[t]here is no obvious mechanism by which UNHCR 
might be held accountable . . . .”14 As such, the refugees have no means 
for legal recourse. This paper argues for the formulation of an “obvious 
 
 11. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 34, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 
T.S. No. 993 [hereinafter ICJ Statute]. 
 12. See Geoff Gilbert, Rights, Legitimate Expectations, Needs and Responsibilities: 
UNHCR and the New World Order, 10 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 349, 380–81 (1998). 
 13. See id.  
 14. Id. at 382. 
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mechanism” to address potential grievances, using approaches that are 
already available under the ICJ statute. 
II. DRAFT ARTICLES ON THE RESPONSIBILITY OF 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: SETTING THE STAGE FOR 
INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL REVIEW 
A number of influential players in international law have questioned 
the lack of legal redressability where UN actions are concerned. For 
example, in 2009 the International Law Commission (ILC) finished its 
draft of 66 articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, 
and requested that States and international organizations submit their 
comments to the UN Secretary-General.15 In many ways, the ILC draft 
articles were a continuation of the previous ILC project on the 
responsibility of the States.  However, the ILC draft articles are 
distinguishable from the previous project because they extend legal 
responsibility to a broad number of new actors. These are defined in the 
articles as “international organizations.”16 This new category of actors 
includes the UN Secretary-General, the World Trade Organization, and 
the World Bank.17 Notably, within its adopted articles, the drafters did 
not define the relationship between responsibility and accountability. 
They also did not attempt to articulate precisely how responsibility, for a 
body such as the UN, would translate into accountability. The connection 
is left ambiguous, although we learn from the commentary that the 
“articles only take the perspective of international law and consider 
whether an international organization is responsible under that law. Thus, 
issues of responsibility or liability under municipal law are not as such 
covered by the draft articles.”18 The ILC draft articles identify no 
international judicial mechanisms for reviewing responsibility against the 
UN for alleged violations of public international law, nor do they 
acknowledge that under the current legal framework, the UN is largely 
judgment-proof. 
While there is legitimate concern that the application of the ILC 
draft articles to any international organization may be too broad to be a 
useful legal tool, the articles in their current form still offer an 
unprecedented opportunity for States to register their legal concerns 
 
 15. Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 61st Sess., May 4–June 6, July 6–Aug. 7, 2009, ¶ 
14, U.N. Doc. A/64/10; GAOR, 64th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2009) [hereinafter ILC 2009 
Report]. 
 16. See id. (referencing the new actors in the International Law Commission project 
as “international organizations”).  
 17. See id. (mentioning three of the “international organizations” in the International 
Law Commission as the UN Secretary-General, the World Trade Organization, and the 
World Bank). 
 18. Id. ¶ 51, art. 1, cmt. 3. 
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regarding assigning responsibility to the UN for violations of 
international law. A proliferation of UN-sponsored activities within 
States, such as deployments of peacekeeping missions, delivery of 
infrastructure loans from international economic institutions, 
implementation of economic sanctions, and provision of disaster relief, 
raise issues about what responsibilities exist when the UN exercises its 
powers as an international organization in the context of international 
law.19 Article 4 of the ILC’s draft articles suggest that international 
organizations should be held responsible for wrongs where actions can be 
attributed to the organization under international law and the action 
constitutes a breach of international law.20 Exactly how can the UN be 
held responsible for these alleged breaches? Which international actor or 
actors should decide whether an action can be attributed to the UN and 
whether the action amounts to a breach? The draft articles are silent on 
this point.  
While there are references in the articles to an international 
organization having an obligation to provide reparation, compensation, 
or satisfaction in the case of a wrongful act,21 the text of the articles is not 
complete. What is missing from the current articles is a vehicle for 
applying the draft articles to actual legal scenarios involving the UN. 
Such vehicles could include the coordinator of international disaster 
services, the command body behind a peacekeeping mission, or the 
purveyor of development aid. Article 39 of the draft articles provides that 
“[t]he members of a responsible international organization are required to 
take, in accordance with the rules of the organization, all appropriate 
measures in order to provide the organization with the means for 
effectively fulfilling its obligations under this chapter.”22 Yet, no mention 
is made as to whether members of an international organization need to 
provide judicial review of the organization’s decision regarding whether 
to provide compensation for a wrongful act.  
This article argues that the UN should be subject to formal judicial 
review for matters that implicate the rights of States under public 
international law. The General Assembly and the Security Council are 
inappropriate for reviewing such UN actions since they are largely 
political institutions rather than expert judicial bodies. Municipal courts 
cannot review issues of UN organization responsibility unless the UN 
waives its immunity from lawsuits as provided for under the Convention 
on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.23 Therefore, 
 
 19. See id. (referencing several activities that the UN sponsors within States).  
 20. See id. ¶ 51, art. 4. 
 21. See ILC 2009 Report, supra note 15, ¶ 51, arts. 34–36. 
 22. See id. ¶ 51, art. 39. 
 23. See Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, Feb. 13, 
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there exists only one body, the ICJ, which is currently well-positioned to 
judicially review UN compliance with public international law.  
If the ILC draft articles are to have immediate applicability to the 
UN, what is needed is an explicit linkage in the text between the 
principles of responsibility and mechanisms of responsibility. The 
content of the draft articles already provides guidance to the ICJ in 
understanding attribution of actions to the UN. In order to access the 
ICJ’s binding jurisdiction, States need a legal mechanism that will 
address existing gaps between the practice of international law in the 21st 
century and the content of the 1945 ICJ statute. In 1945, international 
organizations did not play nearly as pivotal a role in international 
processes as they do today. As will be suggested in Part III below, a 
mechanism for addressing UN responsibility can be provided either 
through a revival of the efforts to amend Article 34 of the ICJ statute, or 
by obtaining a supplementary agreement by UN Member States. This 
supplemental agreement would respond to the UN’s obligation, under 
Article 39 of the ILC draft articles, to provide some neutral judicial 
review mechanism to publicly adjudicate the international responsibility 
and liability of UN agencies.  The remainder of Part II will discuss 
existing barriers to judicial review of UN responsibility and liability.  
A. CURRENT OBSTACLES IN HOLDING THE UN RESPONSIBLE 
The UN has the potential to commit numerous violations of 
fundamental rights, including the unlawful destruction or confiscation of 
civilian property, the violation of due process rights, and the unlawful 
application of economic sanctions to injure vulnerable groups.24 If States 
attempt to hold the UN responsible and demand compensation, reparation 
or satisfaction on behalf of their citizens, they may find themselves 
blocked by treaties such as the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and 
Immunities of the United Nations that largely shield the UN from 
domestic or international judicial review.25 The practice of “absolute 
immunity” resulting in discretionary justice has interfered with efforts to 
hold the UN publicly responsible for violations of either national or 
international law. 
B. ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY 
Since the UN Charter was drafted at a time when it was uncertain 
whether the UN would be able to provide any effective international 
governance, the drafters were highly protective of its infant institutions. 
As a result, Article 105(1) of the Charter provides that the UN shall enjoy 
 
1946, 1 U.N.T.S. 15 [hereinafter Privileges and Immunities Convention]. 
 24. See Reinisch, supra note 7, at 132.  
 25. See Privileges and Immunities Convention, supra note 23.  
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in the territory of each of its Members those privileges and immunities 
that are necessary for the fulfillment of its purposes.26 Article II(2) of the 
1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations 
and Article III(4) of the 1947 Convention on the Privileges and 
Immunities of the Specialized Agencies27 both reflect the post-war 
sentiment that the UN needed robust immunities to separate its 
institutions from any national judicial review.  
The problem was that no one contemplated in the UN’s early history 
that the responsibility of the UN might be the appropriate subject of 
formal adjudicatory review. When the 1949 “Reparation for Injuries 
Suffered in the Service of the United Nations” advisory opinion 
articulated the evolution of the UN into an institution endowed with 
international legal personality,28 no one envisioned that the UN itself 
might engage in behavior that violated international legal standards. 
Subsequent judicial review of UN actions by the ICJ has been limited to 
advisory opinions requested by UN agencies who may have been 
concerned about future relationships with a State.29 For example, in 
Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 Between the WHO and 
Egypt, the World Health Organization (WHO) requested that the ICJ 
review the legality of the process the WHO was proposing to use to 
transfer regional offices from Egypt to Jordan.30 The ICJ’s advisory 
opinion did not bind the parties since Egypt was not involved in the 
proceedings.31 While the WHO unilaterally decided to bring the request 
for an advisory opinion in this matter, there is no guarantee that other UN 
institutions will request opinions in matters that potentially implicate 
responsibility of an international organization.   
While judges have generally criticized the idea of absolute 
immunity as an “anachronistic doctrine incompatible with the demands 
 
 26. See U.N. Charter art. 105, para. 1. 
 27. See Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies 
art. III, § 4, Nov. 21, 1947, 33 U.N.T.S. 261 [hereinafter Privileges and Immunities of the 
UN] (“The specialized agencies, their property and assets, wherever located and by 
whomsoever held, shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process except in so far 
as in any particular case they have expressly waived their immunity. It is, however, 
understood that no waiver of immunity shall extend to any measure of execution.”); 
Privileges and Immunities Convention, supra note 23. 
 28. See Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 
Advisory Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. 174 (Apr. 11) [hereinafter Reparation for Injuries]. 
 29. See Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 Between the WHO and 
Egypt, Advisory Opinion, 1980 I.C.J. 67 (June 6). 
 30. See id.  
 31. See generally Pieter H.F. Bekker, The UN General Assembly Requests a World 
Court Advisory Opinion on Israel’s Separation Barrier, AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L L. (Dec. 
2003), http://www.asil.org/insigh121.cfm (stating that under the ICJ Statute, advisory 
opinions rendered by the Court are non-binding).  
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of justice and the rule of law,”32 such immunity persists in practice since 
municipal courts continue to refuse to find that the UN has waived its 
immunities.33 In fact, the UN has invoked its absolute immunity even 
when doing so may injure a third party. For example, in Shamsee v. 
Shamsee,34 the New York appellate court dismissed a sequestration order 
from an estranged wife because the order was directed at the UN as the 
employer of her former husband. Previously, the New York Court 
Special Term35 had granted the plaintiff a sequestration order requiring 
the UN to pay her spousal support payment from his pension benefits.36 
On principle, the UN refused to comply and requested the U.S. 
Department of State to “issue a suggestion of immunity from legal 
process . . . to the appropriate officials of the Queens County Court.”37 
The legally entrenched reality of absolute immunity has led to the 
unsatisfactory judicial result of ad hoc discretionary justice, described in 
the next sub-section, rather than through processes of external justice.  
The pervasiveness of absolute jurisdictional immunity is illustrated 
well by the ongoing dispute in the Netherlands involving the Mothers of 
Srebrenica. There, a group of families who lost 6,000 family members in 
the Srebrenica Massacre of Bosniak men and boys, filed a civil law suit 
against the Netherlands and the UN because of an alleged failure to act 
effectively to protect civilians in a region that had been declared a safe 
area by the UN.38 The UN never made an appearance in the court case or 
issued any statement. Even in light of the UN’s absence, the Dutch court 
still ruled on immunity and found that Article 105 of the UN Charter, in 
conjunction with the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the 
United Nations, ensured that the UN enjoys immunity from legal 
process.39 The Dutch court found no indication that the UN had waived 
 
 32. McElhinney v. Ireland, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 37, 55 (Loucaides, J., dissenting). 
 33. For example, in the United States, courts have found that the UN has complete 
immunity unless the immunity has been waived. See, e.g., Van Aggelen v. United Nations, 
311 F. App’x. 407 (2d Cir. 2009); Emmanuel v. United States, 253 F.3d 755 (1st Cir. 
2001); Bisson v. United Nations, No. 06 Civ. 6352(PAC)(AJP), 2008 WL 375094 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2008).  
 34. Shamsee v. Shamsee, 428 N.Y.S.2d 33 (App. Div. 1980). 
 35. “Special term” refers to a practice in some court systems of assigning specific 
types of cases to a particular part of the court. See Glossary of Legal Terms, NEW YORK 
STATE UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM, http://www.nycourts.gov/ lawlibraries/glossary.shtml. 
 36. See Shamsee, 428 N.Y.S.2d 33. 
 37. Letter to the Permanent Mission of the United States to the United Nations, 1978 
U.N. Jurid. Y.B. 186, U.N. Sales No. E.80.V.1. 
 38. See Rb.’s-Gravenhage 10 juli 2008, JOR 2008 (Mothers of Srebrenica/The State 
of the Netherlands and the United Nations) (Neth.), available at 
http://zoeken.rechtspraak.nl/resultpage.aspx?snelzoeken=true&searchtype=ljn&ljn=BD67
96&u_ljn=BD6796. 
 39. U.N. Charter art. 105, para. 1. (“The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of 
each of its Members such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfillment of 
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this immunity.40 As a result, the Dutch District Court found that it had no 
jurisdiction to hear the civil case.41 In 2010, the appellate court agreed 
with the District Court’s conclusion, adding a concern that anything less 
than absolute immunity could lead to excessive litigation which would 
jeopardize the ability of the UN to function in maintaining peace and 
security.42 Attorneys for the Plaintiffs have appealed the decision to the 
Dutch Supreme Court and are arguing that the UN may not prove 
judgment-proof if it does not provide some international legal settlement 
mechanism for claimants.43 In September 2010, the Dutch public 
prosecutor agreed to open a criminal investigation of the peacekeeping 
mission.44 However, because of the UN’s absolute immunity against 
prosecution, the plaintiffs remain unable to access any judicial forum 
which will hear its claims of violations of international law by the UN.45  
Relying on the UN to waive its jurisdictional immunity before 
submitting to either domestic or international judicial review undermines 
the legitimacy of public international law as the body of law that has 
been evolving to manage all public international relationships. Even 
though the UN is the flagship international institution, it continues to 
have the capacity to operate at the periphery of international law as a 
result of both its immunity under domestic law and the anachronistic 
nature of the ICJ statute. Under Article 65 of the ICJ statute, the UN 
bodies are empowered to “request” an advisory opinion but are not 
required to seek opinions even if there is a live dispute between a State 
 
its purposes.”); Privileges and Immunities Convention, supra note 23, art. II § 2 ("The 
United Nations . . . shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process except insofar 
as in any particular case it has expressly waived its immunity.”). 
 40. See Rb.’s-Gravenhage 10 juli 2008, JOR 2008 (Mothers of Srebrenica/The State 
of the Netherlands and the United Nations) (Neth.), available at 
http://zoeken.rechtspraak.nl/resultpage.aspx?snelzoeken=true&searchtype=ljn&ljn=BD67
96&u_ljn=BD6796. 
 41. See id.  
 42. See Hof’s-Gravenhage 30 mars 2010, JOR 2010 (Mothers of Srebrenica/The 
State of the Netherlands and the United Nations) (Neth.), available at 
http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/Docs/NLP/Netherlands/Mothers_of_Srebrenica_Judgm
ent_Court_of_Appeal_30-03-2010.pdf. 
 43. Rachel Irwin, UN Ruled Immune From Srebrenica Prosecution, INSTITUTE FOR 
WAR AND PEACE REPORTING (Apr. 3, 2010), http://iwpr.net/report-news/un-ruled-
immune-srebrenica-prosecution (observing that at the end of their appellate decision, the 
Dutch judges “say they ‘regret’ that the UN ‘has not instigated an alternate course of 
proceedings’ as they were required to do when the organisation was created in 1946, as a 
condition of immunity.”).  
 44. Rachel Irwin, Dutch UN Troops Face Srebrenica Probe, CURRENT 
INTELLIGENCE (Sept. 8, 2010), 
http://www.currentintelligence.net/features/2010/9/8/dutch-un-troops-face-srebrenica-
probe.html. 
 45. Id. 
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and a UN institution over an international legal issue.46 In lieu of an 
adjudicative process articulating authoritative legal rulings on matters of 
international organization, responsibility, and liability, the UN relies 
primarily on resolving disputes involving UN Member States through 
diplomatic channels which lack the public transparency associated with 
“good governance” and general practices of rule of law.47 
C. AD HOC DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE  
Despite having absolute immunity, the UN has privately 
acknowledged some responsibility for injuring innocent parties by 
offering compensation to certain injured parties. For example, as a result 
of certain UN Operations in the Republic of the Congo, the UN agreed in 
negotiations with Belgium not to “evade responsibility where it was 
established that the United Nations agents had in fact caused unjustifiable 
damage to innocent parties.”48 
 
 46. ICJ Statute, supra note 11, art. 65 (“The Court may give an advisory opinion on 
any legal question at the request of whatever body may be authorized by or in accordance 
with the Charter of the United Nations to make such a request.”). 
 47. See, e.g,. Servet Yanatma, UN Delays Release of Flotilla Report at Israel's 
Request, TODAY’S ZAMAN (July 25, 2011), http://www.todayszaman.com/news-251578-
un-delays-release-of-flotilla-report-at-israels-request.html (delaying the UN report to allow 
Turkey and Israel to continue their diplomatic reconciliation). See generally Francis N. 
Botchway, Good Governance: The Old, the New, the Principle, and the Elements, 13 FLA. 
J. INT’L L. 159, 160–62 (2001) (discussing transparency in relation to good governance 
and rule of law). Discussions within diplomatic channels are private, so it is difficult to 
report on how diplomats arrived at their decision. However, in some instances public 
discussions of responsibility have become subsumed into ongoing private discussions 
resulting in action through the General Assembly. For example, high profile survivors of 
the 1994 Rwandan genocide prepared a suit against the UN for the UN’s complicity during 
the genocide which resulted in the survivors’ spouses’ deaths. See, e.g., ELIZABETH 
NEUFFER, THE KEY TO MY NEIGHBOR’S HOUSE: SEEKING JUSTICE IN BOSNIA AND 
RWANDA 399–401 (2001); Karen MacGregor, Survivors Sue UN for 'Complicity' in 
Rwanda Genocide, THE INDEPENDENT (London), Jan. 11, 2000, at 16, available at 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/survivors-sue-un-for-complicity-in-
rwanda-genocide-727146.html. While the lawsuits have been dropped and the UN has not 
accepted any responsibility, see NEUFFER, supra, at 400–01 (“The United Nations legal 
staff . . . has denied all liability . . . [and the parties] parted company with their legal team . 
. . .”), the lawsuits helped spur public interest that led to an independent inquiry into the 
UN’s actions in Rwanda commissioned by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. Id. at 400. 
Partly because of this independent inquiry’s report, the UN then created assistance 
programs for survivors of the Rawandan genocide. See, e.g., Assistance to Survivors of the 
1994 Genocide in Rwanda, Particularly Orphans, Widows and Victims of Sexual 
Violence, G.A. Res. 60/225, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/225 (Mar. 22, 2006).  
 48. Exchange of Letters Constituting an Agreement Between the United Nations and 
Belgium Relating to the Settlement of Claims Filed Against the United Nations in the 
Congo by Belgian Nationals, U.N.-Belg., Feb. 20, 1965, 535 U.N.T.S. 199 [hereinafter 
UN-Belgium Settlement]; The Practice of the United Nations, the Specialized Agencies 
and the International Atomic Energy Agency Concerning Their Status, Privileges and 
Immunities: Study Prepared by the Secretariat, [1967] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 219, U.N. 
Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1967/Add.1 [hereinafter Privileges and Immunities Study] 
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Early after its establishment, the UN also acknowledged liability for 
damage caused by the UN Emergency Force,49  the UN’s first 
internationally organized emergency peacekeeping force.50 In 2004, the 
UN Secretariat agreed that the UN must pay compensatory liability 
where “an act of a peacekeeping force is, in principle, imputable to the 
Organization, and . . . committed in violation of an international 
obligation.”51 Yet paying compensation in private is not the same as 
publicly admitting a legal obligation.   
More broadly, the UN Secretary-General made a statement in a 1965 letter to the 
Government of Belgium regarding the UN-caused damages in the Congo: It has 
always been the policy of the United Nations, acting through the Secretary-
General, to compensate individuals who have suffered damages for which the 
Organization was legally liable. This policy is in keeping with generally 
recognized legal principles and with the Convention on Privileges and 
Immunities of the United Nations. In addition, in regard to the United Nations 
activities in the Congo, it is reinforced by the principles set forth in the 
international conventions concerning the protection of the life and property of 
civilian population [sic] during hostilities as well as by considerations of equity 
and humanity which the United Nations cannot ignore.52   
Here, the UN Secretary-General, without accepting any legal 
obligation, acknowledges that it is UN organizational ‘policy’ to pay for 
harms it has caused. The discretionary approach towards compensation is 
also reflected in the language of a 1997 General Assembly Resolution 
which “requests the Secretary-General to continue, in the new system, to 
take into account, when considering all mission-related death and 
disability claims, that such injury or death should be compensable . . . .”53 
As a policy matter, compensation remains a discretionary issue that 
“should be” rather than “is” payable.54 
While the UN may have squarely and conscientiously “assumed its 
liabilities for damage caused by members of its forces in the performance 
of their duties” during the earliest UN peacekeeping operations,55 the 
 
(discussing an instance of a claim made by a State against the UN). 
 49. C. F. AMERASINGHE, PRINCIPLES OF THE INSTITUTIONAL LAW OF 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 242 (1996).  
 50. G.A. Res. 1000 (ES-I), U.N. GAOR, 1st Emergency Special Sess., Supp. No. 1, 
U.N. Doc. A/3354, at 2–3 (Nov. 5, 1956). 
 51. U.N. Secretariat, Letter dated Feb. 3, 2004 from the Secretariat to the 
International Law Commission, in Responsibility of International Organizations, 
Comments and Observations Received from International Organizations, Int’l L. Comm’n, 
56th Sess., May 3–June 4, July 5–Aug. 6 2004, § 2(G), U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/545 (June 25, 
2004). 
 52.  Privileges and Immunities Study, supra note 48, at 220. 
 53. Death and Disability Benefits, G.A. Res. 52/177, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/177 
(Jan. 20, 1999). 
 54. Id. 
 55. U.N. Secretary General, Financing of the United Nations Protection Force, the 
United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia, the United Nations 
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UN’s practice of paying damages has been predicated largely on moral 
grounds rather than a legally articulated obligation to pay 
compensation.56 In practice, this means that there is no external check, 
outside of the withholding of dues by Member States, on the UN’s 
exercise of its discretion to provide compensation when requested.57 The 
discretion to accept or reject responsibility for potential wrongful UN 
acts leaves numerous States like Bosnia with civilian victims in the 
precarious position of relying on the UN’s good faith efforts to redress 
injuries as it sees politically fit.58  
With the potential for the ILC Project on Responsibility of 
International Organizations to be mainstreamed by States, the driving 
force, which is largely moral at present, may be slowly transformed into 
a legalized regime. Given the statements of the Secretary-General in 
1965,59 combined with a historical precedent for paying for damages 
inflicted by peacekeeping troops on civilians,60 there may be an emerging 
customary international rule that the UN must offer compensation when 
it is responsible for a breach of international law. If customary 
international law has reached the point when UN responsibility and 
liability are beginning to crystallize, there remains a crucial deficit: an 
absence of institutions capable of ensuring that an admissible claim of 
responsibility can be judicially reviewed, rather than simply subject to ad 
hoc judgments of UN agencies.  
The current approach for trying to ensure that UN responsibility 
translates into liability is largely a private, diplomatically-negotiated 
matter outside of the review of public tribunals. Domestic courts that 
 
Preventive Deployment Force and the United Nations Peace Forces Headquarters and 
Administrative and Budgetary Aspects of the Financing of the United Nations 
Peacekeeping Operations: Financing of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, ¶¶ 
7–8, U.N. Doc. A/51/389 (Sept. 20, 1996). 
 56. Although the UN has a legal obligation to establish a mechanism to resolve legal 
disputes between the UN and other parties, see Privileges and Immunities Convention, 
supra note 23, § 29, the UN is immune from suit. Id. § 2.  However, the UN has bolstered 
its obligation to pay damages despite its immunity by citing to “the principles set forth in 
the international conventions concerning the protection of the life and property of civilian 
population during hostilities as well as . . . considerations of equity and humanity which 
the United Nations cannot ignore.” Privileges and Immunities Study, supra note 48, at 
220. 
 57. Cf. Norman Kempster, House Wants to Withhold Dues to U.N., L.A. TIMES (May 
10, 2001), http://articles.latimes.com/2001/may/10/news/mn-61661 (threatening to 
withhold UN dues unless the U.S. is put back on the Human Rights Commission). 
 58. See, e.g., Hof’s-Gravenhage 30 mars 2010, JOR 2010 (Mothers of 
Srebrenica/The State of the Netherlands and the United Nations) (Neth.), available at 
http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/Docs/NLP/Netherlands/Mothers_of_Srebrenica_Judgm
ent_Court_of_Appeal_30-03-2010.pdf (holding that the UN is immune from suit in this 
instance). 
 59. Privileges and Immunities Study, supra note 48, at 219–20. 
 60. See, e.g., UN-Belgium Settlement, supra note 48. 
88 MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW  [Vol. 21:1 
 
 
have challenged the compliance of the UN with international law, 
including customary international law, have been stymied from 
proceeding by claims of privileges and immunities and have been unable 
to proceed to the merits of cases.61 Even when actions are attributed to 
the UN, parties may be unable to collect any judgment. For example, the 
District Court of The Hague in the Netherlands ruled in a civil action that 
the actions of Dutch soldiers working for the UN Protection Force would 
be “attributed, strictly, as a matter of principle to the United Nations.”62 
However, the UN was never named as a party to this decision and there 
was no indication in the court record of how the plaintiff could avail 
himself of damages that had been attributed to the UN Protection Force.63 
These ad hoc approaches of making qualified attribution rulings in 
certain limited cases, while applying absolute privileges and immunities 
in numerous other cases, has the potential to lead to at least two 
substantial problems: the non-enforcement of international law against 
international organizations and the inability to collect damages from 
international organizations.   
Notably, some UN bodies, and the World Bank, do allow for suit in 
national courts.64 However, what results is an ad hoc approach as national 
courts apply, in a piecemeal fashion, their national laws on immunity to 
interpret international rights and obligations.65 The World Bank’s 
constitutive statute provides that “[a]ctions may be brought against the 
Bank only in a court of competent jurisdiction in the territories of a 
member in which the Bank has an office, has appointed an agent for 
purpose of accepting service or notice of process, or has issued or 
guaranteed securities.”66 What this means in practice is that a case 
brought in the United States has the potential to result in a different legal 
outcome regarding international obligations than a case in Germany. 
Such disparate outcomes would depend on a number of factors, including 
 
 61. See, e.g., Rb.’s-Gravenhage 10 juli 2008, JOR 2008, ¶¶ 5.16–5.22 (Mothers of 
Srebrenica/ The State of the Netherlands and the United Nations) (Neth.), available at 
http://zoeken.rechtspraak.nl/ 
resultpage.aspx?snelzoeken=true&searchtype=ljn&ljn=BD6796&u_ljn=BD6796. 
 62. Rb.’s-Gravenhage 10 September 2008, JOR 2008, ¶ 4.11 (H.N./The State of the 
Netherlands) (Neth.), available at 
http://zoeken.rechtspraak.nl/detailpage.aspx?ljn=BF0181. 
 63. Id.  
 64. International Bank of Reconstruction and Development Articles of Agreement 
art. 7(3), Dec. 27–Dec. 31, 1945, 60 Stat. 1440, 2 U.N.T.S. 134 [hereinafter IBRD].  
 65. Compare Atkinson v. Inter-Am. Dev. Bank, 156 F.3d 1335, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 
1998) (holding that international organizations have virtually absolute immunity pursuant 
to International Organizations Immunities Act), with Oss Nokalva, Inc. v. European Space 
Agency, 617 F.3d 756, 764–65 (3rd Cir. 2010) (holding that there are exceptions to 
international organizations’ immunity pursuant to the International Organizations 
Immunities Act). 
 66. IBRD, supra note 64, art. 7(3). 
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system-wide approaches to law, familiarity of a judge with international 
law, and constraints of respective domestic laws implementing 
international obligations.  
One of the recurring problems in addressing UN accountability is a 
lack of certainty about where plaintiffs can bring cases identifying 
potential UN responsibility under international law. As Professor 
Reinisch observes:  
In the case of certain international organizations, express treaty-based 
constitutional provisions have even led to questions of whether or not the 
respective organizations are bound by ‘extraconstitutional’ legal standards at all. 
This has resulted in serious doubts about whether any forum has the power to 
assess this issue.67  
While ex gratia payments may satisfy the fundamental need for a 
remedy without the potential complications of judicial review, this ad hoc 
approach interferes with the progressive development of international 
legal norms regarding responsibility. There is nothing systematic about 
side-payments and there is the potential, particularly when there may be a 
power imbalance between the UN and its Member State, that ex gratia 
payments do not reflect the gravity of a particular violation.  
The following section of this article explores the need to identify a 
single, neutral, international judicial forum to adjudicate issues of UN 
responsibility under international law. Under the current approach, the 
UN is largely immune from any legal proceedings in domestic courts 
unless it discretionarily submits to adjudication or enters a settlement 
agreement.68 This approach is inadequate in terms of creating a balanced 
rule of law framework within the UN. 
III. UNIFORM JUDICIAL REVIEW BY THE ICJ OF UN 
RESPONSIBILITY AND LIABILITY   
Given the ad hoc nature of dispute resolution involving UN 
responsibility, there is a nagging issue of how to uniformly, yet 
equitably, approach issues of UN responsibility and liability. This part 
explores two proposals to address the need for a judicial review forum 
for matters involving UN responsibility: 1) reviving historical efforts to 
amend the ICJ Statute to give the ICJ contentious jurisdiction over the 
UN and its specialized agencies, and 2) expanding the realm of ICJ 
“binding advisory opinions” through a supplementary treaty requiring 
disputes involving the UN and international legal responsibility to be 
submitted to the ICJ. 
The patchy legal landscape of scattered privileges and immunities 
 
 67. Reinisch, supra note 7, at 133.  
 68. See Privileges and Immunities Convention, supra note 23, art. 2, § 2; see, e.g. 
UN-Belgium Settlement supra note 48. 
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for the UN, combined with occasional binding decisions under the 
advisory jurisdiction of the ICJ,69 generates uncertainty in assessing UN 
responsibility. What is needed to ensure that principles of liability for 
violations of international law are applied uniformly across the UN 
system is a single judicial forum that is available to all States. Of course, 
this forum should include actors knowledgeable in applying international 
laws and principles. As the UN’s principal judicial organ, the best-
situated institution for this work is the ICJ.  
Even though there has been no systematic review of disputes 
involving UN responsibility, the Court has historically welcomed the 
adjudication of matters involving the UN as part of their mission to 
resolve international disputes using international law.70 Drawing on this 
practice, in his 1995 address to the UN General Assembly, ICJ Judge 
Mohammed Bedjaoui suggested a new relationship between States, 
international organizations, and the Court: 
States, subjects traditionally described as “primary” or “necessary” components 
of the international legal order, are, in reality, no longer the only players in 
international relations, or the only interlocutors where peacekeeping is 
concerned. International life shows us every single day that, at this level, greater 
account must be taken of other entities, notably, the international organizations. 
Access to the Court’s contentious procedure, currently reserved for States alone, 
may therefore now seem too narrow. Among the remedies found for these 
shortcomings has been the incorporation, into certain treaties, of ad hoc clauses 
laying down that, in the event of a dispute between the international organization 
and the States specified therein, that organization will request the Court for an 
advisory opinion, which the two parties agree will have a “decisive” or 
“binding” effect. The technique referred to as that of “compulsory advisory 
opinions” - whose very name underlines its singularity - is, however, no more 
than a stopgap, which cannot be a substitute for full access by organizations with 
international legal personality to the contentious procedure of the Court.71 
Judge Bedjaoui’s comments articulate a clear demand for expanding 
ICJ contentious jurisdiction to encompass international organizations, 
including the UN, in order to reflect a legal reality that has evolved since 
1949. Contrary to what was envisioned at the drafting of the UN 
 
 69. See, e.g., Judgments of Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour 
Organisation upon complaints made against the United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization, Advisory Opinion, 1956 I.C.J. 77, 84 (Oct. 23) (issuing an advisory 
opinion that bound two parties in accordance with an agreement between those two 
parties). 
 70. See Advisory Jurisdiction, INT’L CT. OF JUST., http://www.icj-
cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&p2=2 (last visited Sept. 22, 2011) (explaining the 
ICJ’s ability issue advisory opinions to certain agencies and organs of the UN). 
 71. H.E. Mohammed Bedjaoui, President, Int’l Court of Justice, United Nations 
General Assembly, Fiftieth Session, Plenary: The International Court of Justice: What Will 
Its Future Be? (Oct. 11, 1995), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/presscom/index.php?pr=92&p1=6&p2=1&search=%22assemby%22.  
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Charter,72 international organizations on behalf of coalitions of States 
have assumed leadership roles in managing international conflict and 
developing humanitarian aid.73 Yet, even in light of the organization’s 
pivotal role in the international arena, UN actions are generally not 
judicially reviewable.74 In Judge Bedjaoui’s comments, he is far more 
dismissive of the possibility of securing a broader role for binding 
advisory opinions than this article. As described below, while extending 
contentious jurisdiction to the UN by amending Article 34 of the ICJ 
Statute is legally desirable, it may be unrealistic. On the other hand, 
negotiating a treaty providing for binding advisory opinions for 
international legal disputes involving the UN would be more politically 
palatable to States because it would not trigger a complex UN Charter 
amendment procedure.  
A. OPTION ONE: AMEND ARTICLE 34 OF THE ICJ STATUTE 
Article 34 of the ICJ statute provides that “[o]nly states may be 
parties in cases before the Court” thereby restricting the Court’s ratione 
personae jurisdiction.75 While legal persons (natural or corporate) cannot 
be named parties to an ICJ dispute,76 States may appear on behalf of a 
non-State actor if there has been an international legal violation.77 When 
the ICJ Statute was promulgated, the drafters did not provide standing for 
private persons with disputes against their own States. This was 
presumably because disputes between natural persons and States could be 
handled under municipal law. While this rationale may make sense for 
individual citizens or corporations, the rationale does not apply to 
international organizations. This is especially true of the UN with its 
 
 72. For a discussion of the limited scope of early UN peacekeeping missions, see 
Aiyaz Husain, The United States and the Failure of UN Collective Security: Palestine, 
Kashmir, and Indonesia 1947-1948, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 581, 583 (2007), and for a 
discussion of UN gridlock due to United States-Soviet Union tension on the Security 
Council, see id., at 594–96. 
 73. See The United Nations Today: International Peace and Security, UNITED 
NATIONS, http://www.un.org/aboutun/untoday/peacesec.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2011); 
The United Nations Today: Humanitarian Action, UNITED NATIONS, 
http://www.un.org/aboutun/untoday/haction.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2011). 
 74. See Privileges and Immunities Convention, supra note 23, § 2 (providing 
immunity to the UN “from every form of legal process” with the only exception being 
when the UN voluntarily waives that immunity). 
 75. ICJ Statute, supra note 11, art. 34(1). 
 76. See How the Court Works, INT’L CT. OF JUST., http://www.icj-
cij.org/court/index.php?p1=1&p2=6 (last visited Sept. 23, 2011) (“Only States . . . may be 
parties to contentious cases.”). 
 77. Frequently Asked Questions, INT’L CT. OF JUST., http://www.icj-
cij.org/information/index.php?p1=7&p2=2#2 (last visited Sept. 23, 2011) (“[A] State may 
take up the case of one of its nationals and invoke against another State the wrongs which 
its national claims to have suffered at the hands of the latter . . . .”). 
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bundle of privileges and immunities that shield it from the legal process 
in municipal courts.78 Since the UN can have the ICJ give opinions 
regarding States’ failure to comply with international obligations,79 due 
process and fairness necessitate that the UN also be subject to the same 
process when it is initiated by States.  
Under Chapter II of the ICJ Statute, the UN’s role in the Court’s 
contentious jurisdiction is restricted to being the provider of “information 
relevant to cases before” the ICJ when the international organizations “on 
their own initiative” or at the request of the Court present such 
information.80 This secondary role in dispute resolution when the UN 
serves as a consultant to the Court is inadequate. The role envisioned no 
longer reflects the reality that intergovernmental organizations have 
international obligations and thus may be responsible for violating 
international law. 
In order to secure binding decisions on UN liability, it is 
theoretically possible to broaden Article 34 of the ICJ Statute to give the 
UN standing under the Court’s contentious jurisdiction. This approach 
has been proposed enthusiastically by jurists and academics over the last 
50 years but has yet to garner enough political momentum.81  
While theoretically possible, such an amendment would be a 
difficult legal proposition since the amendment process is involved. 
Specifically, under Article 69 of the ICJ Statute, the process would 
mirror that required to amend the articles of the UN Charter.82 Any 
amendment of the ICJ Statute needs the vote of two-thirds of the 
members of the General Assembly and to be ratified by two-thirds of the 
 
 78. See, e.g., Hof’s-Gravenhage 30 mars 2010, JOR 2010 (Mothers of 
Srebrenica/The State of the Netherlands and the United Nations) (Neth.), available at 
http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/Docs/NLP/Netherlands/Mothers_of_Srebrenica_Judgm
ent_Court_of_Appeal_30-03-2010.pdf. 
 79. For an example of a case wherein the General Assembly was able to seek a 
judicial intermediary concerning a dispute between the UN and State members, see Certain 
Expenses of United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1962 I.C.J. 151 (July 20) which advises 
on a refusal by the Soviet Union and other Member States to pay amounts the General 
Assembly had assessed for peacekeeping operations in the Middle East and the former 
Belgian Congo. 
 80. ICJ Statute, supra note 11, art. 34(2). 
 81. See, e.g., ELIHU LAUTERPACHT, ASPECTS OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 60–66 (1991) (concerning environmental and human rights 
claims); KAREL WELLENS, REMEDIES AGAINST INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS 236–37 
(2002); Laurent Jully, Arbitration and Judicial Settlement Recent Trends, 48 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 380, 390–91 (1954); Bedjaoui, supra note 71.  
 82. ICJ Statute, supra note 11, art. 69 (“Amendments to the present Statute shall be 
effected by the same procedure as is provided by the Charter of the United Nations for 
amendments to that Charter, subject however to any provisions which the General 
Assembly upon recommendation of the Security Council may adopt concerning the 
participation of states which are parties to the present Statute but are not Members of the 
United Nations.”). 
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members of the UN, including all members of the Security Council.83 
Achieving this level of international consensus may be politically 
challenging. As described below, historical efforts to revise the ICJ 
Statute have been subject to considerable debate among States already. 
The idea of providing standing under the ICJ’s contentious 
jurisdiction to international organizations is not a new idea and has a 
relatively long history, nearly as long as the ICJ itself. When the ICJ was 
created in June 1945 by statute, States were concerned with maintaining 
continuity between the Permanent Court of International Justice and the 
ICJ, newly created by the UN Charter.84 Under the League of Nations, 
the Permanent Court had been organized exclusively to settle State-to-
State disputes grounded in the classic view of international law as a 
discipline concerned exclusively with the rights and duties of States.85  
At the 1945 UN Conference on International Organization where the 
UN Charter was signed, some participants, such as Venezuela, proposed 
that international organizations should have standing to appear before the 
Court in some contentious matters.86 While the proposals were not 
adopted by the conclusion of the conference, the idea remained in 
circulation and negotiators agreed that international organizations should 
be engaged in the court process. Specifically, Article 34, paragraph 2 
provided that the Court could request information from public 
international organizations on matters before the Court.87 Under 
paragraph 3 of this article, the UN Registrar is required to communicate 
with international organizations when there are questions about the 
construction of a constituent instrument, or about an international 
convention adopted by an international organization.88 But Article 34, 
paragraph 1 remains steadfast that only States can participate in cases 
 
 83. U.N. Charter, art. 108 (“Amendments to the present Charter shall come into force 
for all Members of the United Nations when they have been adopted by a vote of two 
thirds of the members of the General Assembly and ratified in accordance with their 
respective constitutional processes by two thirds of the Members of the United Nations, 
including all the permanent members of the Security Council.”).  
 84. See id. art. 92.  
 85. See Permanent Court of International Justice Statute art. 34, Dec. 16, 1920, 6 
L.N.T.S. 379 (1921), available at 
http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/LON/Volume%206/v6.pdf (“Only States or 
Members of the League of Nations can be parties in cases before the Court.”). 
 86. United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco, 1945, 
Proposed Draft of Article 34 Submitted by the Delegation of Venezuela, 13 U.N.C.I.O. 
Docs. 480, Doc. 284 (English) IV/1/24 (May 14, 1945) (proposing that the text of Article 
34(2) be drafted so that “[u]pon request from any of the intergovernmental international 
organizations or offices dependent on the United Nations, the Court shall settle conflicts of 
jurisdiction which may arise among them”). 
 87. ICJ Statute, supra note 11, art. 34(2). 
 88. Id. art. 34(3). 
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where the Court exercises its contentious jurisdiction.89 Even though the 
articles provided a role for international organizations under Article 34(2) 
and 34(3),90 the UN was still not permitted to appear as a party in a 
contentious matter.91 
The ICJ’s advisory opinion in its 1949 Reparation for Injuries 
signaled that the UN may eventually become subject to ICJ binding 
judicial review.92 The Court affirmed that the UN has the capacity to 
bring international claims because of its status as an international 
organization formed under the Charter.93 No specific source of the right 
to bring claims was discussed and the Court simply noted that it was 
“clear”94 that the UN had the right to bring claims for damages through 
such methods as “protest, request for an enquiry, negotiation, and request 
for submission to an arbitral tribunal or to the Court in so far as this may 
be authorized by the [ICJ’s] Statute.”95 In spite of the Court’s language, 
which suggests that the UN might bring general claims under the ICJ 
Statute, the reality is that the only claims “authorized by the Statute” 
available to the UN are advisory opinions issued under Article 65 of the 
ICJ Statute.96 Article 34(1) remains unequivocal in its limitation of the 
ICJ’s exercise of contentious jurisdiction to States alone.97   
In the 1950s, groups of legal experts began to raise concerns about 
the state-centric limitations of the ICJ.98 In 1954 the Institute de Droit 
International expressed concern about the inability of international 
organizations whose membership includes States to appear as 
respondents before the ICJ.99 In addition, the International Law 
Association, as a group of legal experts, proposed in 1956 an amendment 
to the ICJ Statute such that the UN and its specialized agencies would be 
 
 89. Id. art. 34(1). 
 90. Id. art. 34(2)–(3). 
 91. Id. art. 34(1). 
 92. Reparation for Injuries, supra note 28.  
 93. Id. at 180. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 177. 
 96. ICJ Statute, supra note 11, art. 65. 
 97. Id. art. 34(1). 
 98. See, e.g., WELLENS, supra note 81 (discussing two organizations of legal 
scholars: the International Law Association and the Institut de Droit International). 
 99. Id. at 237 (citing Resolutions Adopted by the Institute at its Session at its Session 
at Aix-en-Provence, 22 April—1 May 1954, 45(II) INSTITUT DE DROIT INT’L 296, 298 
(1954)). The Institut de Droit International is an invitation only, independent organization 
of legal experts. Statutes, INSTITUT DE DROIT INT’L art. 1, art. 5, http://www.idi-
iil.org/idiE/navig_statutes.html, (last visited Sept. 21, 2011). After being founded in 1873, 
it was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1904 for its work on promoting arbitration 
between States as a means of peaceful conflict resolution. History, INSTITUT DE DROIT 
INT’L, http://www.idi-iil.org/idiE/navig_history.html, (last visited Sept. 24, 2011). 
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able to appear before the Court in contentious cases.100 Both the Institute 
de Droit International and the International Law Association were 
concerned with ensuring that international adjudication reflected the 
emerging relationships among primary international actors, including 
international organizations.  
In 1977, the U.S. Department of State, in response to Senate 
Resolution 78 (May 9, 1974),101 published a study on whether the United 
States should undertake diplomatic efforts to widen access to the ICJ for 
individuals, corporations, non-governmental organizations, 
intergovernmental organizations, and regional organizations for cases 
raising questions of international law.102 The report noted that widening 
access to the Court would increase the Court’s contribution to the 
development of international law by promoting “unification in the 
interpretation and application of international law.”103 The report 
examined the possibilities of increasing the number of organizations 
capable of requesting advisory opinions or amending Article 34(1) of the 
Statute.104 On the issue of amending Article 34(1), the Department of 
State was open to the idea of international organizations being subject to 
contentious jurisdiction as long as both the General Assembly and 
Security Council agreed on any potential submission of a matter to 
contentious jurisdiction.105 The Department of State recognized in the 
1970s that achieving the needed votes for an amendment would be 
difficult but that it supported an amendment “in principle . . . at some 
later, more propitious time.”106  
Scholars and practitioners have urged for some time that 
international organizations, including the UN, should be subjected to 
ICJ’s contentious jurisdiction. One year after the formation of the ICJ, 
Director-General of the International Labour Organisation Wilfred Jenks 
criticized the ICJ’s bifurcated jurisdictional structure, finding that the 
“[i]nconvenient and irritating restrictions upon access to the Court by the 
specialized agencies will encourage the latter to rely upon ad hoc 
tribunals for the determination of questions which might more 
appropriately be referred to the Court.”107 
Laurent Jully observed arbitration and settlement trends in 1954 and 
 
 100. WELLENS, supra note 81, at 236.  
 101. S. Res. 78, 93d Cong. (1974) (enacted). 
 102. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, STUDY ON WIDENING ACCESS TO THE INTERNATIONAL 
COURT OF JUSTICE, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 187 (1977). 
 103. Id. at 190. 
 104. Id. at 196–200. 
 105. See id. at 201. 
 106. Id. at 205. 
 107. C. Wilfred Jenks, The Status of International Organizations in Relation to the 
International Court of Justice, 32 TRANSACTIONS OF THE GROTIUS SOC’Y 1, 19 (1946). 
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emphasized the need for consistency in international law, writing that 
“the revision of Article 34 will be one of the first tasks to be undertaken 
as being capable of bringing about an important improvement in this 
special province of international law.”108 Jully, noting the light docket of 
the ICJ at the time, expressed concern that:  
It is somewhat paradoxical that the numerous specialized agencies, which stand 
in close relationship to the United Nations, should be obliged to set up separate 
and ad hoc bodies for the settlement of future disputes, while the Charter has 
established, or rather confirmed in existence, a first-class judicial organ, 
benefiting from a long experience as well as a high reputation, and which could 
certainly deal with more work than is at present being entrusted to it.109  
In terms of institutions structured to hear public international legal 
disputes, the ICJ is perfectly situated to adjudicate any public 
international legal dispute involving the UN.  
Cambridge University lawyer Sir Elihu Lauterpacht argued that 
international organizations should have the power to present claims to the 
ICJ.110 In particular, he observed that where an international organization 
acts as a defendant in a given case, such as a responsibility case, the 
ICJ’s exercise of contentious jurisdiction would be especially reasonable 
because such a case would involve a dispute over international law.111 As 
he commented:  
While [the rights and duties of international organizations] can, of course, be 
resolved in any particular ad hoc arrangement for dispute settlement involving 
international organizations . . . Article 34 of the Statute of the ICJ should be so 
amended that international organizations are no longer a priori excluded from 
participation in the contentious work of that Court.112  
As Lauterpacht observes, the ICJ is the most appropriate institution 
to hear cases when the UN is in conflict with a State or group of States.  
Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, the United Kingdom’s counsel to the ICJ, 
observed that there “[t]here is a strong case, though it may not be free 
from all difficulty” for international organizations to be litigants.113 He 
observed: 
It seems probable that had the basic drafting of the Court’s Statute been carried 
out within, say, the last twenty years, instead of over half a century ago, the 
present paragraph 1 of Article 34 of the Statute—while not necessarily including 
international organizations in terms as entitled to be parties as litigants—would 
at least not have been drafted in such a way . . . as clearly to exclude them.114  
What Sir Fitzmaurice recognized over 30 years ago is how 
 
 108. Jully, supra note 81, at 391. 
 109. Id. 
 110. See LAUTERPACHT, supra note 81, at 61–65. 
 111. See id. at 66. 
 112. Id.  
 113. Gerald Fitzmaurice, Enlargement of the Contentious Jurisdiction of the Court, in 
THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 478–79 (Leo Gross ed., 1976). 
 114. Id. at 479. 
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anachronistic the ICJ Statute is in its treatment of international 
organizations as disputants. However, in 1945, few States recognized that 
the UN would have legal claims to assert and that States might also have 
claims to assert against the UN.115 
Shabtai Rosenne, author of numerous treatises on the ICJ, explained 
why nothing has happened to secure Article 34 reform in spite of 
numerous suggestions for it. Professor Rosenne related that even though 
there appeared to be a practical need for UN standing in contentious 
cases, the absence of political will explains the lack of reform.116 He 
illustrated his premise with two proposals presented by the States of 
Guatemala and Costa Rica in 1997 to the Special Committee on the 
Charter of the United Nations and on the Strengthening of the Role of the 
Organization.117 Both of these proposals requested amendment of the ICJ 
Statute to allow the UN and other international organizations to be parties 
to contentious cases.118 When the proposals were considered, the Special 
Committee adopted no conclusions,119 and the General Assembly 
expressed its intent to take no action that might have implications for any 
changes in the UN Charter or the Statute.120 In 1999 Guatemala withdrew 
its proposal to extend contentious jurisdiction to certain international 
organizations and to evaluate whether international organizations 
generally should have direct access to the ICJ’s contentious 
jurisdiction.121 According to Rosenne, the proposal was “feasible 
 
 115. See id. (“[T]he notion of international organizations of States as having an 
international personality of their own separate from and additional to that of their 
individual component members . . . had not gained any real currency.”). 
 116. See SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
COURT 1920-2005, VOL. II JURISDICTION 632–33 (4th ed. 2006). 
 117. See id. 
 118. See Special Comm. on the Charter of the U.N. and on the Strengthening of the 
Role of the Org., Jan. 27–Feb. 7, 1997, Possible Amendments to the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice to Extend its Competence with Respect to Contentious 
Matters to Disputes Between States and International Organizations, Working Paper 
Submitted by Guatemala, U.N. Doc. A/AC.182/L.95 (Jan. 28, 1997) [hereinafter 
Guatemala Proposal]; Special Comm. on the Charter of the U.N. and on the Strengthening 
of the Role of the Org., Jan. 27–Feb. 7, 1997, Possible Amendments to the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice to Extend its Competence with Respect to Contentious 
Matters to Disputes Between States and International Organizations, Working Paper 
Submitted by Costa Rica, Alternative Drafting to the Working Paper Submitted by Costa 
Rica, U.N. Doc. A/AC.182/L.97 (Feb. 4, 1997) [hereinafter Costa Rica Proposal]. 
 119. See Rep. of the Special Comm. on the Charter of the U.N. and on the 
Strengthening of the Role of the Organization, U.N. Doc. A/53/33; GAOR, 53d Sess., 
Supp. No. 33 (1998) (refraining from recommending action upon the proposals). 
 120. G.A. Res. 53/106, ¶ 4(e), U.N. Doc. A/RES/53/106 (Dec. 10,  1998). 
 121. See Special Committee On UN Charter Concludes Two-Week Session, SCIENCE 
BLOG (Apr. 23, 1999), 
http://www.scienceblog.com/community/older/archives/L/1999/A/un990575.html 
(“Marja-Liisa Lehto (Finland), Chairman of the Special Committee, commended the 
flexibility shown by the Guatemala delegation in withdrawing a proposal that did not 
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technically but not politically, at least for the time being.”122 Guatemala’s 
speech withdrawing its proposal before the Special Committee reflected 
on the political hurdles of amending the ICJ Statute with reserved 
optimism:  
We consider it advantageous that the predominantly favourable views that, 
primarily in the academic area, have been expressed with regard to the 
possibility of expanding the ICJ’s jurisdiction in the manner proposed have been 
complemented by the reaction of States to that possibility . . . . We consider that 
we should now take a long-term view and have regard to both the rapidity with 
which everything evolves in this era of profound and unpredictable changes, and 
the importance that intergovernmental organizations, whose number grows 
incessantly, are increasingly taking on. We believe that within this long-term 
perspective the hope subsists that the proposal we have presented will one day 
be adopted.123 
As the fifty-plus years of effort to amend Article 34 of the ICJ 
Statute suggest, international law evolves slowly and States, as well as 
other key players, are rarely inclined to experiment with new legal 
arrangements. Given the incremental nature of international legal reform, 
it is not surprising the U.S. Department of State in the 1970s suggested 
waiting for a “more propitious time” to seek amendment of the ICJ 
Statute.124 Mirroring this sentiment, in the late 1990s Guatemala was 
willing to pin its hope for reform on a “long-term perspective.”125  
While it is not clear that the time for amendment is any more 
“propitious” today than it was in the late 1990s, the efforts of Costa Rica 
and Guatemala provide guidance for what an acceptable amendment 
might look like.126 The two proposals to amend Article 34(1) of the 
Statute were amenable to several States in 1997.127 The Guatemala 
 
garner support.”). 
 122. ROSENNE, supra note 116, at 633.  
 123. Translation of a Statement by Guatemala at the 5th Mtg. of the Sixth Committee 
on the Report of the Special Committee on the Charter of the United Nations and the 
Strengthening of the Role of the Organization (Agenda Item 159) (Oct. 13 1999), 
http://www.un.int/guatemala/english/speeches/juridico/1999/13-oct-1999.html 
[hereinafter, Statement by Guatemala].  
 124. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 102, at 205 (“[S]upport in principle of such 
a proposal represents a sound and forward-looking approach.”). 
 125. See Statement by Guatemala, supra note 123 (“We believe that within this long-
term perspective the hope subsists that the proposal we have presented will one day be 
adopted.”). 
 126. See Guatemala Proposal, supra note 118 (proposing amendments to Article 34); 
Costa Rica Proposal, supra note 118 (proposing amendments to Article 34). 
 127. See, e.g., Press Release, Calls for Burden-Sharing Mechanism to Ease Sanctions 
Effects on Third States, As Sixth Committee Continues Discussion of Report of Charter 
Committee, U.N. Press Release GA/L/3075 (Oct. 20, 1998) (amenable to Georgia); Press 
Release, Sixth Committee Opens Review of Report of Charter Committee Discussing 
Effect of Sanctions on Third States, U.N. Press Release GA/L/3073 (Oct. 16, 1998) 
(amenable to Cuba).  See also Statement by Guatemala, supra note 123 (referring to 1978 
support for the principal of expanded jurisdiction by eighteen States, including two 
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Proposal included an amendment of Article 34(1) and the addition of a 
number of new articles.128 The amendment of Article 34(1) opened the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ to the “United Nations or any other 
international organization comprised of States” as long as one of three 
things was true: the constituent instrument of the organizations permitted 
ICJ jurisdiction, the State members of the organization agreed in a treaty 
to compulsory ICJ jurisdiction for the organization, or the State parties to 
the dispute and the organization agreed to refer the dispute to the 
Court.129 The Costa Rica Proposal built on the Guatemala Proposal but 
did not restrict Article 34(1) to international organizations comprised 
only of States; it permitted any international organization that was 
authorized by its constituent instrument to seek ICJ compulsory 
jurisdiction.130 
The greatest hurdle to making the ICJ’s contentious jurisdiction 
include the UN is, as commentators have pragmatically observed, the 
entirety of the ICJ amendment process. The amendment process is 
straightforward yet lengthy. Article 69 of the ICJ Statute provides that an 
ICJ amendment is the same procedurally as a UN Charter amendment.131 
The Court has the power to propose amendments to the Secretary-
General who will then propose these amendments to States.132 As 
Rosenne alluded to in his treatise on the ICJ, amending the ICJ Statute is 
not really a technical problem of updating the Statute to reflect current 
international legal realities, but a problem of political will and political 
inertia.133  
The problem lies in the political constraints of securing an 
amendment that is procedurally equivalent to a UN Charter amendment. 
The UN Charter provides in Article 108 that an amendment to its Charter 
would require an adoption by two-thirds of the members of the General 
Assembly and ratification by two-thirds of the members of the UN, 
including all of the permanent members of the Security Council.134 
 
permanent members). 
 128. See Guatemala Proposal, supra note 118. 
 129. Id. § B. 
 130. See Costa Rica Proposal, supra note 118.  
 131. There is additional language in the ICJ Statute, supra note 11, art. 69, providing 
that the amendment process is subject to General Assembly provisions that may be 
adopted concerning the participation of States which are parties to the ICJ Statute but not 
members of the UN. Presently all parties to the ICJ Statute are also members of the UN. 
See States Entitled to Appear Before the Court, INT’L CT. OF J., http://www.icj-
cij.org/jurisdiction/ index.php?p1=5&p2=1&p3=1&sp3=b (last visited 23 Sept. 2011) 
(listing no States as parties to ICJ but not members of the UN). 
 132. ICJ Statute, supra note 11, art. 70.  
 133. See ROSENNE, supra note 116, at 633 (“The view was expressed that the 
proposal was feasible technically but not politically, at least for the time being.”). 
 134. U.N. Charter art. 108.  
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Likewise, an amendment to the ICJ Statute would require the same two-
thirds adoption and ratification from the UN’s current 192 Member 
States.135 The reaction of the permanent members of the Security Council 
remains an unknown, especially as to whether they might exercise their 
veto power under Article 108.136 Among the permanent Security Council 
members, only the United Kingdom has recognized the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the Court over itself, suggesting that the United Kingdom 
may be open to compulsory jurisdiction being extended further.137 France 
and Russia have also availed themselves of the ICJ’s contentious 
jurisdiction.138 As described above, while the United States expressed in 
its domestic policy thirty years ago an interest in broadening access to the 
ICJ, it is unclear whether the same policy reform interest remains.139 
China has never appeared before the ICJ.140  
Moreover, a request to open up an amendment process like that of 
the UN Charter is likely to stall because of its potential to influence other 
aspects of UN governance that are currently disputed. An opportunity to 
revise the ICJ Statute may be perceived by some States as a backdoor 
opportunity to reinvigorate debates that have been unsuccessfully 
concluded over reforming the whole UN institutional framework. The 
larger questions of other areas of UN reform requiring the same series of 
votes from the General Assembly, ratifications by Member States, and 
approval by the Security Council would quickly dwarf concerns of 
institutionalizing ICJ contentious jurisdiction over issues involving UN 
responsibility. 
There is one other issue that requires discussion when considering 
whether Article 34 reform would be sufficient to review UN 
responsibility and accountability. Even if international organizations in 
general, and the UN in particular, were able to appear before the ICJ, it is 
unclear as to whether they would be compelled to appear. One of the 
recurring issues with pursuing a judicial matter against the UN is the 
 
 135. Compare ICJ Statute, supra note 11, art 70 (adopting the U.N. Charter 
amendment procedure), with U.N. Charter art. 108 (requiring a two-thirds vote to amend 
the U.N. Charter). 
 136. Thomas G. Weiss, The Illusion of UN Security Council Reform, 26 WASH. 
QUARTERLY, Autumn 2003, at 147, 150. 
 137. See Declarations Recognizing the Jurisdiction of the Court as Compulsory, INT’L 
CT. OF J., http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&p2=1&p3=3 (last visited 
Sept. 23, 2011) (listing 66 countries submitting to ICJ art. 36(2) compulsory jurisdiction). 
 138. See List of Cases Referred to the Court Since 1946 By Date of Introduction, 
INT’L CT. OF J., http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=2 (last visited Sept. 23, 
2011) [hereinafter List of ICJ Cases] (listing all countries which have appeared before the 
ICJ, including France and Russia). 
 139. See supra notes 102–106 and accompanying text. 
 140. See List of ICJ Cases, supra note 138 (omitting China). 
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prevalence of absolute immunity.141 Courts have been reluctant to find 
that the UN has waived its immunity to appear in municipal courts.142 
Unless the UN was somehow required by the agreement of UN Member 
States to submit to compulsory jurisdiction by an amendment of Article 
36, the UN may very well choose not to submit its disputes to the ICJ’s 
contentious jurisdiction. Instead, the UN may continue to resolve 
international legal disputes concerning its responsibility in an ad hoc 
fashion. Simply granting the UN standing under Article 34 would, in and 
of itself, not be sufficient since the UN would then be able to 
strategically decide when it would appear. States with unresolved public 
law complaints against the UN who seek judicial resolution need greater 
certainty that the UN will appear. The following section looks at one 
judicial mechanism that could improve UN accountability without 
amending the ICJ Statute.   
B. OPTION TWO: OBTAIN BINDING ADVISORY OPINION UNDER 
SUPPLEMENTARY TREATY  
Presently only States can receive judicial review of contentious 
matters by the ICJ under Article 34.143 UN organs and UN specialized 
agencies are limited to requesting advisory opinions under Article 65 
which provides that “[t]he Court may give an advisory opinion on any 
legal question at the request of whatever body may be authorized by or in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations to make such a 
request.”144  
While the Court does deliberate on matters involving UN rights and 
responsibilities under its advisory jurisdiction, these opinions are 
considered to have less weight than a similarly situated contentious 
jurisdiction decision.145 In part, this goes to the issue of whether the 
deliberations of the Court are res judicata when the ICJ acts in its 
advisory capacity, as opposed to its contentious capacity. Ordinarily in a 
contentious matter, the principle of stare decisis does not apply, since a 
decision only binds the parties to a particular case.146 Even so, the Court 
will frequently rely on previous cases as being instructive to the Court in 
their legal reasoning.147 Still, in issuing advisory opinions, one may 
 
 141. See supra Part II.B. 
 142. See, e.g., supra notes 33, 38 and accompanying text. 
 143. ICJ Statute, supra note 11, art. 34. 
 144. ICJ Statute, supra note 11, art. 65. 
 145. See André Gros, Concerning the Advisory Role of the International Court of 
Justice, in TRANSITIONAL LAW IN A CHANGING SOCIETY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF PHILIP 
JESSUP 313, 315 (Wolfgang Friedmann et al. eds., 1972) (explaining the distinction 
between advisory opinions and “judgments”). 
 146. See ICJ Statute, supra note 11, art. 59. 
 147. See Gros, supra note 145, at 315 (explaining that the common distinction 
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wonder whether the ICJ is simply providing well-reasoned suggestions 
rather than legal analyses.  
Alexander Fachiri, writing about the Permanent Court of 
International Justice on which the ICJ was largely modeled, suggested 
that international court advisory opinions should not be distinguished 
from contentious decisions, since the deliberative processes are the 
same.148 He wrote: 
It is submitted that the principles laid down and points decided in advisory 
opinions have the same effect by way of precedent as the judgments of the 
Court, and will contribute to an equal degree in the development of international 
law . . . . The Court itself has shown its appreciation of the importance of its 
advisory opinions by framing them with elaboration and including a full 
statement of the reasons upon which the conclusions arrived at are based.149  
The modern interpretation is that generally, unless there is language 
in a given treaty requiring parties to request a binding advisory opinion 
from the ICJ, such an opinion will have no binding force.150 In the realm 
of ascertaining responsibility and assigning liability, the inability to bind 
parties to a particular decision is problematic. Yet as Fachiri implies, 
there is no reason that the Court, acting under its Article 65 powers, 
cannot issue decisions with the same binding force as a contentious 
decision.151 After all, the Court uses similar procedures in an advisory 
case as it does in a contentious case,152 and the Court is still exercising 
authority in a judicial fashion.  
International legal practitioners have perceived this “double 
standard” problem and have sought to remedy it through a novel 
approach of applying the Court’s advisory jurisdiction. One such 
approach was formulated by Laurent Jully, who observed in the 1950s 
that international organizations were finding alternative approaches when 
seeking dispute resolution:  
In order to evade the obstacle of Article 34—perhaps not as formidable as it 
looks at first—public international organizations have used two distinct legal 
devices: The first is a treaty provision whereby a dispute as to the interpretation 
or application of the treaty in question . . . shall be submitted to the Court for an 
 
between advisory opinions and judgments is not a rigid barrier). 
 148. See ALEXANDER FACHIRI, THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL 
JUSTICE: ITS CONSTITUTION, PROCEDURE, AND WORK 71 (1925). 
 149. Id. 
 150. See MOHAMED SAMEH M. AMR, THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF 
JUSTICE AS THE PRINCIPAL JUDICIAL ORGAN OF THE UNITED NATIONS 110 (2003) 
(explaining competing views regarding ICJ opinions). 
 151. See FACHIRI, supra note 148, at 69–70; ICJ Statute, supra note 11, art. 65. 
 152. See ICJ Statute, supra note 11, art. 68 (“In the exercise of its advisory functions 
the Court shall further be guided by the provisions of the present Statute which apply in 
contentious cases to the extent to which it recognizes them to  be applicable.”). Articles 66 
and 67 furthermore permit interested parties to furnish information on the question and 
require advisory opinions to be delivered publicly, respectively. Id. arts. 66–67. 
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advisory opinion, it being clearly understood that the parties will consider the 
opinion given by the Court as decisive. . . . The other device used by 
international organizations is the classical one of arbitration.153  
In light of the presently non-binding nature of advisory opinions, 
one possible solution exists in the development of a supplementary treaty 
requiring the UN to submit to advisory opinions. This paper will not 
explore arbitration as a second device to avoid “the obstacle of Article 
34”154 since arbitration lacks some of the important procedural 
components of the ICJ. For example, unlike Article 34 decisions or 
advisory opinions, arbitration reports may be kept confidential from the 
public. In spite of the advantages of efficiency generally associated with 
arbitration, the evolution of public international law must remain a matter 
for public deliberations.155 
In some limited instances, treaties have been negotiated providing 
the ICJ with the ability to issue binding opinions under its Article 65 
powers. These treaties, such as the Convention on the Privileges and 
Immunities of the United Nations156 and the Convention on the Privileges 
and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies,157 contain clauses referring 
a dispute between the treaty members to the ICJ for a final, binding 
decision. The “compromissory clauses” in various international 
agreements requesting ICJ resolution of disputes between the UN and a 
State have been recognized by some scholars as adequate, albeit indirect, 
legal authority for triggering ICJ decisions under Article 65 of the ICJ 
Statute which might bind the parties.158  
The legal reasoning allowing for such binding advisory opinions, in 
spite of there being no such authority in the ICJ Statute or Rules, was 
articulated early in the ICJ’s existence in the Judgments of Administrative 
Tribunal of ILO case.159 The Court took the position that the ILO statute 
at issue160 in the case was nothing more than “a rule of conduct for the 
 
 153. Jully, supra note 81 at 389–90. 
 154. Id. at 389. 
 155. The ICJ Statute already recognizes the transparency advantages in ensuring that 
deliberations on public international matters remain public. Article 46 of the ICJ Statute, 
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 156. Privileges and Immunities Convention, supra note 23, art. VIII, § 30. 
 157. Privileges and Immunities of the UN, supra note 27, art. IX, §§ 31–32. 
 158. See Roberto Ago, “Binding” Advisory Opinions of the International Court of 
Justice, 85 AM. J. INT’L L. 439, 441 (1991) (summarizing the work of Professor Paolo 
Benvenuti) (“From this perspective, the quality of a ‘decision,’ the ‘binding force’ 
attributed under certain conditions to an advisory opinion, far from being an exception to 
the rule, is consistent with the natural and customary effects of the definition of rights and 
obligations by the Court in exercising its advisory jurisdiction.”). 
 159. Judgments of Administrative Tribunal of ILO upon complaints made against 
UNESCO, Advisory Opinion, 1956 I.C.J. 77 (Oct. 23). 
 160. See generally Statute of the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour 
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Executive Board, a rule determining the action to be taken by it on the 
Opinion of the Court.”161 In a later decision, the Court reasoned that as 
long as it does not feign to be acting under the ICJ Statute or Rules when 
it issues a “binding advisory opinion,” it could issue advisory opinions 
that would functionally bind the parties.162 Whether a decision was 
binding or not in practice was of little concern to the Court as long as the 
parties did not invoke the ICJ Statute or Rules to transform an advisory 
opinion into a “binding” advisory opinion.  
In many cases, the subject of “binding” advisory opinions is largely 
a matter for academic debate since there are few treaties providing for 
ICJ review in cases of dispute with UN institutions. They include 
headquarter agreements, privileges and immunities agreements, and 
arrangements related to specific UN facilities.163 There is no language in 
general subject multilateral treaties under which the UN is expected to 
invoke the ICJ’s advisory jurisdiction to conclusively decide a matter 
between parties. For example, existing human rights treaties, 
environmental treaties, and humanitarian law treaties do not explicitly 
address UN responsibility or liability.164 Yet this omission leaves a 
lacuna in jurisprudence where States, as individual members within a 
general-subject treaty regime, are subject to international judicial review 
mechanisms that the UN evades. Therefore, the UN remains free of 
accountability as long as it has not specifically consented to bringing a 
dispute with a State or another UN agency to the ICJ. In practice, this 
means that there are few opportunities to judicially review the 
responsibility of the UN for any breach of either customary international 
law or treaty law.  
Outside of the small population of treaties concluded between the 
UN and States that invoke the mechanism of “binding” advisory 
 
Organization, available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/tribunal/about/statute.htm. 
 161. Judgments of Administrative Tribunal of ILO, supra note 159, at 84.  
 162. Application for Review of Judgment No. 158 of United Nations Administrative 
Tribunal, Advisory Opinion, 1973 I.C.J. 166, ¶¶ 39–40 (July 12). 
 163. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and 
International Organizations or between International Organizations art. 66, Mar. 20, 1986, 
25 I.L.M. 543, 578 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]; Agreement for the Establishment in 
Cairo of a Middle Eastern Regional Radioisotope Centre for the Arab Countries art. XVI, 
IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/38 (Oct. 18, 1962); Agreement Relating to the Headquarters of the 
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East in Thailand, UN–Thai., art. XIII, May 
26, 1954, 260 U.N.T.S. 35; Agreement Regulating Conditions for the Operation, in Chile, 
of the Headquarters of the UN Economic Commission for Latin America, UN–Chile, art. 
XI, Feb. 16, 1953, 314 U.N.T.S. 49. 
 164. Treaties, as primary sources of international law, are generally negotiated 
between States and cannot bind the UN unless the UN is an explicit party to the treaty. The 
UN is not a party to existing human rights, environmental, or humanitarian law treaties. 
While treaties can articulate specific duties and roles for the UN, State negotiators have 
declined to assign legal responsibility to the UN.  
2012] BINDING THE UNITED NATIONS 105 
 
 
jurisdiction, there exists a failure to agree upon a binding mechanism to 
hold the UN responsible for international legal violations. This failure 
remains a substantial, systematic problem. Even in recent international 
discussions over recommended environmental liability mechanisms, 
there has been no explicit recognition of the possibility for disputes 
arising between the UN and States. For example, in a recent document 
designed to ensure liability mechanisms for victims of pollution and 
environmental damages,165 the Committee of Permanent Government 
Representatives to the UN Environmental Programme encouraged each 
State to create domestic law that would assess strict liability to operators 
for activities dangerous to the environment.166 Notably, the drafters 
focused exclusively on domestic remedies. They never contemplated that 
the UN itself could engage in dangerous environmental activities and 
that, unlike private operators who may be subject to municipal courts of 
law, the UN could avail itself of certain privileges and immunities that 
would shield it from operator liability under domestic law.167 This 
oversight, or deliberate omission, is significant. In some respects, the 
UN, as a multilateral institution that frequently operates across borders, 
has far greater potential for creating environmentally dangerous 
conditions than many UN Member States who are disengaged from 
global affairs.168 
Judge Bedjaoui, in his comments to the General Assembly, was 
highly critical of binding advisory opinions, declaring them “stopgap 
measures” that failed to address the underlying need to amend the ICJ 
Statute to reflect the role of international organizations as international 
decision makers.169 However, these hybrid opinions should not be so 
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readily dismissed. Instead, they should be regarded as offering a unique 
opportunity for reforming the UN system to better reflect the heightened 
role of international organizations in implementing the international 
system. In addition, opting for binding advisory opinions would not 
trigger the general amendment process that a revision of Article 34 
requires. To the extent that States agree in principle that the UN should 
be held accountable where there has been a demonstrable breach of 
international law, there is room for creating a uniform judicial 
mechanism. One possibility is the adoption of a narrowly–tailored treaty 
that would require both UN institutions and UN Member States to 
submit disputes between them that arise under treaty or customary 
international law, including disputes on behalf of injured third–parties, to 
the advisory jurisdiction of the ICJ for a binding opinion. Such a treaty 
would avoid the problem of these opinions currently being applied as 
“stopgap measures” and would provide a degree of certainty, uniformity, 
and predictability in the context of dispute settlement between States and 
the UN.   
Regardless of their non-binding nature, it is apparent that the UN 
views current advisory opinions by the ICJ as important. For example, 
the UN has complied with opinions obtained under the ICJ’s advisory 
jurisdiction by recommending that the Security Council act in accordance 
with ICJ opinions, establishing Special Committees to respond to ICJ 
opinions, and passing resolutions specifically adopting ICJ opinions.170 
Even without the Court’s exercise of contentious jurisdiction binding the 
UN, the UN has deemed advisory opinions as authoritative judicial 
decisions.171 From the perspective of the UN’s existing compliance with 
ICJ opinions, compelling the UN to submit to the Article 65 advisory 
capacity of the Court should not lead to widely different outcomes than if 
the Court exercised compulsory jurisdiction over the UN under its Article 
34 powers to resolve contentious disputes.  Rather, it would ensure a 
greater degree of accountability vis-à-vis the UN.   
Article 66 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between 
States and International Organizations or between International 
Organizations provides some drafting guidance on measures that might 
 
international legal personality to the contentious procedure of the Court.”). 
 170. AMR, supra note 150, at 116–119. 
 171. See ICJ Statute, supra note 11, art. 68 (“[While exercising its advisory functions] 
the Court shall further be guided by the provisions of the present Statute which apply in 
contentious cases to the extent to which it recognizes them to be applicable.”), art. 59 
(“The decision of the Court has no binding force except between the parties in respect of 
that particular case.”); see also Richard Falk, International Court of Justice, in THE 
OXFORD COMPANION TO POLITICS OF THE WORLD 403, 404 (Joel Krieger et al. eds., 2d 
ed. 2001). 
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ensure binding advisory jurisdiction over the UN.172 Article 66 provides 
that in cases of interpretation under the Vienna Convention the ICJ may 
give a binding decision if 1) “a State is a party to the dispute to which 
one or more international organizations are parties” and the State asks the 
General Assembly, Security Council or another qualified UN agency “to 
request an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice” or 2) 
the UN, as a party to the dispute, decides to request an advisory 
opinion.173 
While the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States 
and International Organizations provides an approach for both States and 
the UN to trigger ICJ binding advisory jurisdiction,174 under neither 
approach is the UN compelled to appear. Rather, the State and the UN 
both “may” request opinions. The notion of exercising discretionary 
power in judicial review is problematic when parties have reached an 
impasse. In the context of the ICJ’s discretionary power under Article 65 
of the ICJ Statute, scholars have argued that: 
[T]he idea of discretionary power, even if it is moderated by the safeguards 
found in the Court’s jurisprudence, is puzzling. The textual argument on which it 
is based (the “may” in Article 65 of the Statute) is very weak and should yield to 
the spirit of the provision on the advisory function which testifies to the 
obligatory co-operation of the Court with the UN organs in the solution of legal 
questions.175 
If the language of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
between States and International Organizations was included in a future 
treaty on adjudicating UN responsibility, there is some question as to 
whether the UN would ever choose to submit its disputes to ICJ review. 
When States want to be certain that they have a forum to address 
UN responsibility for international legal violations, the UN should be 
required to submit any live dispute concerning potential UN 
responsibility or liability under international law that has not been 
resolved in a reasonable amount of time to the ICJ for an advisory 
opinion under Article 65. As with the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties between States and International Organizations and other 
conventions providing for “binding advisory opinions,” the States, as 
well as the UN, should agree that any ICJ decision would be equivalent 
to a judgment and binding on all parties.  
However, a treaty that only requires the UN to submit disputes to 
the ICJ will not, by itself, be adequate to address UN responsibility or 
liability. In order to avoid the shield of privileges and immunities that 
 
 172. Vienna Convention, supra note 163, at 578. 
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have prevented domestic courts, such as the Dutch courts,176 from 
entering judgments of responsibility and liability against the UN, any 
supplementary treaty must explicitly waive the invocation of UN 
privileges and immunities for cases referred to the ICJ for an advisory 
decision. The treaty might also, for purposes of justice and efficiency, 
establish a reasonable time frame within which the UN would be 
expected to submit unresolved disputes, such as within one year of the 
dispute being brought to the attention of the UN. A timeline would 
encourage amicable settlements of dispute that might otherwise disrupt 
cooperative relations among Member States and the UN. 
With the adoption of a treaty assigning binding advisory jurisdiction 
over most international legal claims involving the UN as a party, there 
are a number of advantages that solve justice and efficiency concerns. 
For example, the single venue for adjudication, the ICJ, avoids the 
possibility of fragmented interpretations of international law by various 
domestic systems or internal UN administrative agencies. In addition, the 
existence of a single venue ensures that domestic privileges and 
immunities do not insulate the UN from international responsibility and 
liability claims. Likewise, the single ICJ venue should provide continuity 
in international decision-making since the ICJ will have a history of the 
cases it has previously decided and may employ similar analytical 
frameworks in determining responsibility and allocating liability. Thus, 
in addition to consistency in the application of international law, this 
proposal would also provide some consistency across adjudication 
involving questions of responsibility and international organizations. 
Any treaty concluded among State parties could exempt certain 
types of cases from ICJ advisory review. While this paper proposes that 
the ICJ should be the court of first resort for matters that implicate 
international organization responsibility, not all cases would necessarily 
be appropriate for its review. In cases that chiefly implicate UN 
administrative matters, such as interpretation of UN employment rules 
for example, review arguably should remain under the jurisdiction of the 
UN Administrative Tribunal. Indeed, Former ICJ Judge Roberto Ago 
eloquently advocated this position when the ICJ issued a “binding” 
advisory opinion on an internal UN matter. He stated that the ICJ had 
exceeded its authority, since “the International Court of Justice is thus 
compelled to resolve questions that, for the most part, do not involve the 
application of those rules of international law” which it is mandated to 
apply.177 
Another type of case that might be exempted from judicial review 
 
 176. See supra notes 38–45 and accompanying text. 
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would be the review of the legality of resolutions by UN bodies.178 In 
Questions of Interpretation and Application of 1971 Montreal 
Convention Arising from Aerial Incident at Lockerbie, the ICJ was 
confronted with the legality of a specific Security Council Resolution 
requiring Libya to submit to diplomatic and commercial sanctions in 
response to failing to comply with another Security Council Resolution 
requiring it to surrender two of its nationals for trial in the United 
Kingdom.179 Ultimately, the Court never ruled on the legality of the 
Security Council Resolutions and instead limited its decision to holding 
that the UN Charter trumped the 1971 Montreal Convention.180 In spite 
of the ICJ being the lead judicial organ for the UN, there would likely be 
strong resistance from Security Council members if the legality of 
specific Security Council Resolutions were to be the subject of an ICJ 
advisory opinion. However, examining whether a UN agency has 
properly complied with a resolution issued by a UN body could be 
suitable for an advisory opinion.  
The proposal for a new treaty to waive UN privileges and 
immunities before the ICJ and recognize ICJ jurisdiction over disputes 
among UN agencies, as well as between States and the UN, is a 
reasonable end result of fully recognizing UN legal personality. Given 
the UN’s articulated concerns with promoting international 
accountability, the UN might even be an active proponent of a treaty that 
strengthens the ICJ’s existing powers as the premier public international 
legal court. Even so, there could be institutional resistance within the 
UN. Current dispute resolution of matters involving the UN and breaches 
of international law is predicated on diplomatic interventions. UN 
officials may be uneasy with relinquishing case-by-case diplomatic 
solutions to a panel of judges. Hopefully, UN officials would not lose 
sight of the benefits of such a treaty. After all, the negotiation of a treaty 
would address the recurring issue that States, acting both on their own 
behalf and on the behalf of third parties, lack any adequate judicial forum 
for engaging the UN. Furthermore, UN support of a treaty could enhance 
the legitimacy of the UN as an institution of good governance.   
Correctly worded, a treaty would solve other logistical issues as 
 
 178. See Dapo Akande, The International Court of Justice and the Security Council: 
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Council, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (1996) (describing how the overlap between the ICJ and the 
Security Council will inevitably lead to some judicial review). 
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well. For example, the explicit identification of the ICJ as the single 
judicial dispute settlement body responsible for adjudicating UN 
responsibility would satisfy the international requirement under Section 
29 of the Convention on Privileges and Immunities. Section 29 requires 
that the UN create “appropriate modes of settlement . . . [for d]isputes 
involving any official of the United Nations who by reason of his official 
position enjoys immunity . . . .”181 A treaty could also address the 
emerging requirement under Section 39 of the Draft Articles on the 
Responsibility of International Organizations that members of a 
responsible international organization “take, in accordance with the rules 
of the organization, all appropriate measures in order to provide the 
organization with the means for effectively fulfilling its obligations . . .” 
when it is responsible for a violation.182 
Precisely how such a treaty would be negotiated raises a number of 
interesting questions. Would the treaty be negotiated exclusively by UN 
Member States? Would States be able to make reservations regarding 
which advisory opinions would be deemed binding? Would those 
reservations interfere with the object and purpose of the treaty to provide 
uniform judicial resolution to matters involving UN responsibility and 
liability? Would the UN be invited to formally confirm the treaty? Could 
a failure of the UN to formally confirm the treaty prevent States from 
bringing this supplementary treaty into force?  
These are matters that would need to be taken under advisement by 
the negotiating parties, which may or may not include the UN. What is 
certain is that the concept of international organization responsibility, as 
articulated in the ILC’s draft articles,183 lacks substance by failing to 
articulate a formal judicial review measure. Twenty years ago, former 
ICJ Judge Ago asked whether the time has not finally come “to allow 
international organizations prosecuting claims against states or resisting 
claims by them to take the main road, rather than the byway of an 
‘advisory’ procedure artificially given decisive value and binding effect, 
which so ill become its intrinsic nature?”184 Unfortunately, Judge Ago’s 
request to amend the ICJ Statute, as with previous efforts, has failed to 
gain political traction in part, as described earlier,185 because amending 
the ICJ Statute is perceived as part of a larger and far more complex 
political process of reforming the UN. Yet, there is no reason for the UN 
to have special protected legal status within the international legal system 
itself.  
 
 181. Privileges and Immunities Convention, supra note 23, art. VIII, § 29. 
 182. ILC 2009 Report, supra note 16, art. 39. 
 183. See supra notes 15–22, 182 and accompanying text. 
 184. Ago, supra note 158, at 451.  
 185. See supra Part III.A. 
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Even if the “more straightforward” process of amending the ICJ 
Statute through an amendment of Article 34 is preferable to this article’s 
proposed “by-way” process of having a quorum of States, through a 
treaty, require the UN to submit disputes over responsibility to the ICJ, 
any proposed amendment is likely to fail without a collective agreement 
or at least internal momentum to amend the ICJ Statute. As Judges Ago 
and Bedjaoui reluctantly seem to admit by acknowledging the legal 
mechanism of “binding advisory opinions,” the next best option must be 
to rely on the existing mechanisms of the ICJ Statute as triggered by a 
supplementary treaty. While perhaps less elegant of a solution when 
compared to a simple amendment of the ICJ Statute, this second option 
possesses one crucial characteristic that the amendment process lacks: it 
is immediately viable for the quorum of States that sign the treaty. 
Furthermore, it is not inconceivable that, in efforts to negotiate a treaty to 
secure regular advisory jurisdiction over UN contentious matters, States 
will muster the political will to make amendments to Article 34 and 36 of 
the ICJ Statute. Until then, States are confined to applying the existing 
tools within the ICJ Statute, which are sufficient, although not perfect, 
for ensuring judicial review of matters involving UN responsibility and 
liability under international law.  
The proposal for formalizing the mechanism of “binding advisory 
opinions” to include a broader array of international actions serves the 
dual goals proposed by the International Law Association’s Committee 
on Accountability of International Organisations.186 In their draft report, 
the Committee called for rules that “will have to keep the balance 
between preserving the necessary autonomy in decision-making of 
[international organizations] and guarantee that the [international 
organizations] will not be able to avoid accountability.”187 A narrowly 
drafted treaty focused on facilitating ICJ adjudication of UN 
responsibility could do just that.  
IV.  CONCLUSION 
In order for international law to maintain its credibility among 
Member States, there needs to be continuity and predictability. These 
elements must exist in the interpretation of the law of international 
responsibility both as it applies to States, as well as to the UN. Currently, 
the responsibility of the UN for breaches of international law is 
approached on an ad hoc basis. In some instances, the UN has 
acknowledged its responsibility and made discretionary damage 
payments. In other instances, organizations have been protected by 
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privileges and immunities.   
When the UN has damaged or caused inadvertent harm to groups or 
individuals as a result of their activities, there is a need for judicial 
review to ensure that the international law of responsibility is interpreted 
consistently and applied uniformly. To create this assurance, one judicial 
body should address these rare but important cases. As argued above, the 
appropriate body is the International Court of Justice. 
This article has reviewed two possibilities for achieving review of 
the international legality of UN actions. Numerous ICJ jurists and some 
States have called for an enlargement of the number of parties who can 
invoke the ICJ’s contentious jurisdiction. As former ICJ Judge Ago 
reflected in his seminal 1991 article, States and the UN have historically 
needed to be treated differently since there was great uncertainty about 
whether the UN would survive as an institution.188 Times have changed 
significantly and as Ago queries, “can this differentiation be justified 
now that it has become commonplace for international organizations and 
states to be parties, on an equal footing, to disputes concerning the 
interpretation and application of bilateral agreements, as well as general 
conventions?”189 This article concludes that for purposes of uniform rule 
of international law, States and the UN must be treated equally as 
primary actors of international law. To the extent that either a State or the 
UN fails to comply with international law, the international community 
needs to be able to rely on a neutral decision maker to ascertain 
responsibility.  
Although a revised Article 34, which includes the UN as party to 
contentious jurisdiction, is attractive for simplicity, the proposal is 
fraught with bigger political issues involving stubborn discussions over 
UN institutional reform. While such amendments would have a major 
impact on the law of international responsibility, international liability, 
and international institutions, these amendments are unlikely to 
materialize because they would require commencing a complicated 
amendment process.190  
A more politically viable option is to accept the ICJ Statute and 
Rules as they are and instead provide for a supplementary convention 
addressing the issue of UN responsibility. Such an agreement would 
specifically require that unless the UN is able to reach an acceptable 
settlement within a reasonable time frame, it must submit disputes over 
issues of international law to the advisory jurisdiction of the ICJ. This 
supplementary treaty would be an important step towards transparently 
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ensuring that the rule of law is available for State parties that cannot 
privately resolve their legal grievances with the UN. 
The effects of such a convention on access to justice are easy to 
envision. In disaster-ridden Haiti, the families of the children who were 
mistakenly shot by UN peacekeepers and the families of cholera victims 
might receive some solace in knowing that the UN does not operate with 
impunity because it has failed to provide a standing claims commission 
or grievance process for individuals injured by UN bodies.191 Rather, the 
UN, if it is to reflect the rule of law upon which it is founded, must be 
held to the same standards of judicial review as States and be held 
judicially responsible for those actions and omissions that violate 
fundamental public international law. As international law has evolved, 
both States and the UN agencies must have a reliable forum to pursue 
emerging issues of international responsibility, a forum in which they can 
assign accountability. The institutions that the community of nations 
created through the UN Charter must not be above or separated from the 
rule of law.  
The proposals in this paper are an attempt to ensure that States can 
have some recourse for adjudicating international organization 
responsibility on behalf of their citizens. By calling for judicial review by 
the ICJ, this article endeavors to make a contribution to the line of robust 
scholarship by ICJ judges and international legal academics seeking to 
declare that the UN is not separate from, but equal to, other recognized 
international actors. Unlike some international reforms that threaten the 
status quo of international interactions, the enlargement of ICJ 
jurisdiction is not a threat to States; rather, it is a promise that the UN 
will be responsible for complying with the same body of public 
international law as States.  
While the international community has missed past opportunities to 
address UN accountability due to barriers of maintaining political will, 
the time is now propitious to evolve the UN System to reflect 
international legal realities. The ILC Draft Articles on the Responsibility 
for International Organizations provide the policy-making momentum for 
States to enter a supplementary treaty or amend ICJ Article 34, in order 
to ensure that the UN’s actions are grounded in the foundations of 
international law. The continued efforts at differentiating UN actions 
from trans-boundary State actions are legally disingenuous. As Karel 
Wellens has observed, “there is no inherent reason why remedial 
outcomes of restitution, damages, specific performance, satisfaction and 
injunctive relief, applicable under the regime of state responsibility 
should not also become available under the organizational responsibility 
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regime.”192 
Our faith in the international system as one that is just and fair 
depends on it being capable of responding justly and equitably to crises 
and disputes. States have already formally commended the ILC’s Articles 
on State Responsibility and are exploring the possibility of a convention 
on State responsibility for internationally wrongful acts.193 The current 
drafting process of the Articles on the Responsibility of International 
Organizations presents an unprecedented opportunity for States to 
overcome a half century of inertia. States should use this opportunity to 
champion the rule of law for both States and the UN by ensuring that the 
ICJ truly serves as “the principal judicial organ”194 for all UN 
institutions. 
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